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In this paper, we introduce the psychological concept of anxiety into agency
theory. An important benchmark in the anxiety literature is the inverted-U
hypothesis, which states that an increase in anxiety improves performance
when anxiety is low, but reduces it when anxiety is high. We show that the
inverted-Uhypothesisisconsistentwithevidencethathigh-poweredincentives
canreducetheagent’s optimal effortand expectedperformance.Inequilibrium,
however, a proﬁt-maximizing principal never offers such counterproductive
incentives. We also show that the inverted-U hypothesis can explain empirical
anomalies related to monitoring, the informativeness principle, and the risk–
reward tradeoff.
1. Introduction
The economic concept of risk aversion expresses a primitive distaste
for uncertainty. In psychology, however, attitudes toward risk are sub-
sumed under the much broader concept of anxiety, which extends well
beyondapreferenceforcertaintytoincludecognitiveandphysiological
components.1 For example, anxiety is often measured using cognitive
self-report scales as well as physical indicators such as heart rate,
blood pressure, muscle tension, and EEG frequency. An important
benchmark in the anxiety literature is the inverted-U hypothesis (IUH) or
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Yerkes-Dodson Law, which states that the relationship between anxiety
and performance is an inverted-U—an increase in anxiety improves
performance when anxiety is low, but reduces it when anxiety is high.
The book “Just Enough Anxiety” by Rosen (2008) popularizes this idea
for a broad business audience.
There is substantial evidence on the importance of anxiety, even
for professionals. Singh (1998) ﬁnds that certain stressors reduce the
performance of professional salespeople, whereas Jordet et al. (2007),
Dohmen (2008), and Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2008) ﬁnd that
anxiety and pressure are an important element of penalty kicks in pro-
fessional soccer. Ariely et al. (2005) consider the effects of incentives on
performanceinsixseparatetasks.Theseexperimentswereconductedin
ruralIndia,whichallowedtheexperimenterstoprovideextremelyhigh
incentives.Indeed,thepaymentforsuccessinanyonetaskintheirhigh-
incentive treatment was equivalent to about one month’s per capita
consumption. In all six tasks, they found either a decreasing or inverted-
U relationship between incentives and performance. To explain their
ﬁndings, Ariely et al. explicitly invoke the IUH and suggest that many
oftheirsubjects“collapsedunderpressure”similartostudentssuffering
from test anxiety.2
To assess the relative importance of anxiety as compared with
other psychological and personality factors, we consider the ﬁve factor
model in personality psychology, where the ﬁve main traits are Neu-
roticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, and
Conscientiousness.
Neuroticism, often labeled by the positive pole of the trait
Emotional Stability, is the tendency to show poor emo-
tional adjustment in the form of stress, anxiety, and depres-
sion. Extraversion represents the tendency to be sociable,
dominant, and positive...Individuals who score high on
Openness to Experience are creative, ﬂexible, curious, and
unconventional...Agreeableness consists of tendencies to
be kind, gentle, trusting and trustworthy, and warm. Finally,
Conscientiousindividualsareachievement-orientedandde-
pendable..., as well as orderly and deliberate.
Judge and Ilies (2002, p. 798).
According to the meta-analysis of Judge and Ilies (p. 803), the
most important factor for motivation (e.g., an agent’s choice of effort) is
Neuroticism (which includes anxiety) followed by Conscientiousness.
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Likewise, the meta-analysis in Hurtz and Donovan (2000, table 1) ﬁnds
thatthemostimportanttraitforjobperformance(includingcustomerser-
vice, managerial, sales, and other jobs) is Conscientiousness, followed
by Neuroticism.3 On this basis, we conclude that anxiety is one of the
most important psychological factors in principal–agent relationships.
Inthispaper, weintroduce theIUHintothelinear principal–agent
modelofHolmstr¨ omandMilgrom(1991).Thespeciﬁcsofourmodelare
motivated by the processing efﬁciency theory (PET) of Eysenck and Calvo
(1992) in cognitive psychology, where the initial impact of anxiety is
to induce worry, a cognitive activity which uses up scarce attentional
resources and “crowds out” the agent’s effort in the principal’s task.
On the other hand, worry also stimulates various coping mechanisms
which can offset its crowding-out effects, so an increase in anxiety can
either increase or decrease the agent’s effort and performance.
Because worry is evidently the agent’s next best activity, we
incorporatetheIUHintotheagent’sdisutilityofeffort,whichrepresents
theopportunitycostoftimespentontheprincipal’stask.Speciﬁcally,we
assume that anxiety is proxied by income risk (the standard deviation
of income) and the marginal cost of effort is U-shaped in the latter. As
income risk increases, the agent’s anxiety grows, but initially his coping
mechanisms more than sufﬁce and the marginal cost of effort declines.
Eventually, however, the marginal cost of effort is increasing in anxiety
because of diminishing returns to coping. Given this assumption, there
is an inverted-U relationship between the agent’s optimal effort and
incentives, as well as between optimal effort and output risk (the
standard deviation of the productivity shock) in accordance with the
IUH.Inparticular,high-poweredincentivescaninduce“chokingunder
pressure” as in the Ariely et al. experiments.
In addition to Ariely et al., Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), Gneezy
(2003), and the survey by Frey and Jegen (2001) provide evidence that
incentives can in fact backﬁre (i.e., reduce effort and performance). The
theoreticalliteratureonthehiddencostsofincentivesincludesB´ enabou
and Tirole (2003, 2006) and Guo and Ou-Yang (2006). At the same time,
there is no doubt but that incentives can be an extremely powerful
motivator. For example, Lazear (2000, p. 1347) reports that productivity
increased by about 44% (some of it due to selection effects) when the
Safelite Glass Corporation switched from hourly wages to piece rates:
Some conclusions are unambiguous. Workers respond
to prices just as economic theory predicts. Claims by
3. Casadesus-Masanell (2004) (see the case of ethical standards) and Ramalingam and
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sociologists and others that monetizing incentives may actu-
ally reduce output are unambiguously refuted by the data.
As Prendergast (1999, p. 18) observes, “While this idea [coun-
terproductive incentives] holds some intuitive appeal, it should be
noted that there is little conclusive empirical evidence (particularly in
workplace settings) of these inﬂuences.” A similar dichotomy occurs
in our model—although they can indeed backﬁre, a proﬁt-maximizing
principal never offers such incentives. There is therefore nothing in-
herently contradictory about observing counterproductive incentives
in experiments (where they are often exogenous) but not in the ﬁeld
(where they are endogenous).4 Our paper therefore formalizes aspects
of the more general but informal critique in Glaeser (2003).
The IUH can also explain other empirical anomalies. According
to the informativeness principle due to Holmstr¨ om (1979), a given perfor-
mancemeasureshouldbeincludedinthecontractiffitisinformative(at
the margin) with respect to the agent’s effort. In particular, the principal
should never inject pure noise into the contract. As Prendergast (1999,
p. 21) notes, however, “perhaps the most striking aspect of observed
contracts is that the Informativeness Principle...seems to be violated in
many occupations.” For example, Oyer and Schaefer (2005) document
that many ﬁrms grant stock options to all employees even though they
impose substantial risk with only trivial incentive effects. In this paper,
we show that the principal wants to inject pure noise into the contract
when the workplace environment is too static because in that case an
increase in anxiety is motivational.
Another empirical anomaly is the mixed evidence for the clas-
sical risk–reward tradeoff (see Prendergast, 1999), which predicts that
incentives should be decreasing in output risk. In this paper, we show
that the risk–reward tradeoff is violated when anxiety is low and the
agent’soptimaleffortisincreasinginbothincentivesandoutputrisk.In
that case, the latter are strategic complements for the principal and will
therefore be positively related. Finally, we consider some implications
of the IUH for optimal monitoring in light of the evidence in Barkema
(1995).
Although Casadesus-Masanell (2004) and Oyer (2004) provide
importantalternativeexplanationsforviolationsoftheinformativeness
principleandGuoandOu-Yang(2006)andPrendergast(2002a,b)forthe
risk–reward tradeoff, an advantage of our approach is that it addresses
all of the above issues within a single theoretical framework. As Rosen
(2008) emphasizes, the common intuition underlying all our results is
4. The experimental literature on endogenous incentives includes Fehr and G¨ achter
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that one of the central tasks of management is to foster an optimal
amount of tension in the workplace.
TheanxietyliteratureineconomicswaspioneeredbyLoewenstein
(1987) and Caplin and Leahy (2001). The former paper introduces the
concept of the utility of anticipation to explain why a rational agent
might delay a pleasant experience in order to savor it, but hasten an
unpleasant one to reduce the period of dread (or anxiety). The latter
paper provides a comprehensive theoretical framework for thinking
aboutanxietyandotheranticipatoryemotions.Animportantelementin
that framework is an abstract exogenous map from economic outcomes
(e.g., income) to psychological states (e.g., anxiety), which is taken
to be an economic primitive akin to preferences. In Rauh and Seccia
(2006),wedevelopamorestructuredanxietyconcept,albeitinaspeciﬁc
learning context, and show that the IUH obtains over a certain region
of parameter space. In a closely related paper, Caplin (2003) considers
the use of fear as a policy instrument (e.g., antismoking campaigns)
and shows that its effects can be nonmonotonic, because moderate
fear messages can induce an appropriate behavior by capturing the
recipient’s attention, whereas extreme ones can backﬁre by provoking
avoidance (i.e., defensive inattention).
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In the next
section, we brieﬂy survey aspects of the anxiety literature in economics,
psychology, and other disciplines. In Section 3, we present our model
and results. Section 4 examines some of our modeling choices in more
detail, including our reliance on the linear Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom
(1991) framework and our assumptions on preferences that incorporate
the IUH. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2. Anxiety and the Linear Model
For motivational purposes, we recall aspects of the linear agency model
with a single task. Assume output is given by q = e +  , where e is
the agent’s effort and   is a normally distributed productivity shock
with mean zero and variance σ2. In this context, the agent’s expected
performance(i.e.,expectedoutput)isequivalenttoeffort.Werestrictthe
class of feasible contracts to those that are linear in output I = α + βq,
where I is income, α the ﬁxed component, and β the piece rate. We
discuss the assumption of linear contracts in detail in Section 4 below.
Assume the agent’s utility function is given by
−exp{−r[I − (1/2)ke2]},( 1 )
where r is the coefﬁcient of absolute risk aversion and the expression
following income is the agent’s quadratic disutility of effort. Under92 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
these conditions (see Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005, p. 137–139), the
agent’s certainty equivalent is
α + βe − (1/2)ke2 − (1/2)rβ2σ2,( 2 )
where the ﬁrst two terms represent expected income and the ﬁnal term
is the risk premium, which expresses the cost of risk in monetary terms.
In this context, the agent’s optimal effort e = β/k is strictly
increasing in β and is therefore inconsistent with the evidence on
counterproductive incentives (e.g., Ariely et al.). It is also completely
independent of output risk σ, which is not generally the case but an
artifactofthespeciﬁcassumptionsofnegativeexponentialutility,linear
contracts, and normality. The discrepancy with the anxiety literature
is even more stark, where there is substantial experimental and ﬁeld
evidence that anxiety has important implications for behavior.
2.1 Deﬁnitions
The IUH has been expressed in terms of stress, arousal, and anxiety.
Although deﬁnitions have not been standardized, the ﬁrst is often
deﬁned as
a state in which some demand is placed on the individual,
who is then required to react in some way to be able to cope
with the situation...If one doubts one’s ability to cope with
the stressor, then feelings of anxiety will likely ensue.
Woodman and Hardy (2001, p. 290)
Note that stress can be a negative or positive state depending on the
agent’s expectations about coping with it. The concept of arousal has
been deﬁned in terms of alertness, intensity, motivation, and readiness.
Although controversy remains over the meaning of arousal,
most contemporary researchers...operationalize arousal as
a condition that ranges along the sleep-high excitation con-
tinuum and ﬁnds expression in physiological, psychological
(cognitive and affective), and behavioral terms.
Zaichkowsky and Baltzell (2001, p. 320–322)
According to Woodman and Hardy (2001, p. 290–291),
Anxiety is generally accepted as being an unpleasant emo-
tion...Researchers in mainstream psychology have sug-
gested that anxiety might have at least two distinguishable
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anxiety or worry, and a physiological component normally
termed somatic anxiety or physiological arousal.
(italics in the original)
With respect to the ﬁrst component,
Worryisacognitivephenomenon,itisconcernedwithfuture
events where there is uncertainty about the outcome, the
future being thought about is a negative one, and this is
accompanied by feelings of anxiety.
MacLeod et al. (1991, p. 478)
(as quoted in Caplin and Leahy, 2001)
The term physiological arousal refers to objective physiological manifes-
tations of arousal (e.g., an elevated heart rate), whereas somatic anxiety
istheagent’ssubjectiveperceptionofthemwhichcanbeassessedusing
self-report scales.
2.2 The Processing Efﬁciency Theory
The relationship between anxiety, effort, and expected performance is
the subject of the PET of Eysenck and Calvo (1992) from cognitive
psychology. According to the PET, anxiety has two potential effects.
First, the initial impact of a negative stressor (e.g., income risk) is to
induce worry, which consumes the agent’s cognitive resources and
“crowds out” his on-task effort (e.g., effort on the principal’s task). The
second potential effect distinguishes the PET from previous anxiety
theories.
Subsequently, there are two major types of reaction to
poor performance and threat of aversive consequences:
(1) coping directly with the current level of threat and
worry (e.g., repression or denial; calming down and self-
revalorisation)...(2) reduction or elimination of the effects
of worry on performance by applying additional resources
(e.g., effort or time) or activities (e.g., rote learning, articula-
tory rehearsal, seeking external assistance) to the task.
Eysenck and Calvo (1992, p. 416)
That is, the agent can either cope directly, which reduces worry and
its associated crowding-out effects, or he can increase effort or effort
capacity. In either case, on-task effort increases. The overall effect of
anxiety on effort and expected performance therefore depends on the94 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
relative magnitudes of these two effects: the initial crowding-out effect
and the agent’s subsequent response.
TheIUHfollowsfromthePETassumingdiminishingreturnswith
respect to the second effect. In that case, the agent’s coping mechanisms
and/or re-allocation of effort resources prevail when anxiety is low,
but eventually the crowding-out effect dominates when anxiety is high.
We also emphasize that the above considerations extend well beyond
a primitive dislike of risk. In the linear model, optimal effort does not
depend on income risk and the only effect of the latter is to increase
the amount of the ﬁxed component α of the contract to compensate
the agent for the increase in his risk premium. In more general moral
hazard models such as Holmstr¨ om (1979), a risk-averse agent chooses
effort in part to reduce risk, but that characterization falls well short of
the cognitive processes (e.g., worry and coping) described in the PET.
2.3 Evidence for the Inverted-U Hypothesis
Despite its status as the main benchmark in the anxiety literature, the
evidence for the IUH is mixed. As Muse et al. (2003, p. 355) point out,
the evidence is strongest in the case where the IUH is expressed in
terms of arousal. For example, the Ariely et al. experiments fall into this
category, because arousal is often characterized in terms of incentives
and motivation. In their survey of the sports psychology literature,
Zaichkowsky and Baltzell (2001) discuss several experimental and ﬁeld
studies that support the IUH, as well as some that do not. Anderson
(1990)defendstheusefulnessofthearousalconceptandtheIUHagainst
the criticisms in Neiss (1988) and notes that the evidence for the IUH is
stronger for cognitive as opposed to motor tasks, where the former are
often more important in workplace environments.
The pioneering study in the stress literature was Anderson (1976),
who found an inverted-U relationship between recovery performance
and perceived stress among 102 small business owners after Hurricane
Agnes in 1972. Similar to the PET, high recovery performance was
associated with moderate perceived stress and problem-solving coping
mechanisms. Likewise, Baer and Oldham (2006) ﬁnd an inverted-
U relationship between creativity and creative time pressure among
employees at a certain cereal manufacturer who scored high on creative
support and Openness to Experience in the ﬁve factor model. The
authors recommend (p. 969) that
if management is interested in boosting creativity, supervi-
sorsmightﬁrstidentifytheobjectiveconditionsthatproduce
the experience of creative time pressure and alter thoseAgency and Anxiety 95
conditions so employees experience intermediate pressure
with respect to creative pursuits.
Rosen’s (2008) “Just Enough Anxiety” makes the same point more
broadly.
Overall, the evidence is weaker when the IUH is expressed in
terms of stress. According to Muse et al., out of 52 studies 46% ﬁnd
a negative linear relationship, 13% a positive linear one, 4% support
the IUH, and the rest report either mixed evidence or no relationship
between stress and performance. As they point out, however, the bulk
of these studies report linear correlations and therefore rule out the IUH
ap r i o r i .Furthermore, a positive or negative monotonic relationship
is not necessarily inconsistent with the IUH, because the data might
correspond to either the left or right component of the inverted-U,
respectively. Finally, Muse et al. argue that all but one of the 52 studies
sufferfromatleastoneofthefollowingdefects:(i)usingstressmeasures
that are not designed to register low levels of stress or (ii) that are
exclusively associated with negative connotations of stress and (iii)
over-sampling high-stress subjects.
2.4 Professionals
The subjects in the Ariely et al. experiments were relative novices.
Do professionals choke under pressure? Palacios-Huerta (2003) and
Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2007, 2008) ﬁnd that chess and professional
soccer players choose approximately equilibrium strategies in strategic
settings that mimic their professional environments, whereas college
s t u d e n t sd on o t . 5
Nevertheless, there is substantial evidence that professionals can
and do choke under pressure. For example, Dohmen (2008) shows that
professional soccer players are more likely to choke on penalty kicks at
home. He explains his ﬁndings in terms of the social pressure hypothesis
from social psychology, which states that even friendly observation can
impair performance (note that Ariely et al. found similar results). Jordet
et al. (2007) ﬁnd that choking on penalty kicks is more likely in World
Cup soccer matches than in the European Championships and Copa
America because the stakes are higher in the former. Apesteguia and
Palacios-Huerta (2008) ﬁnd that the team who kicks ﬁrst in a penalty
shoot-out wins about 60% of the time. The source for this ﬁrst-mover
advantageisthattheprobabilityofscoringisworsewhentheotherteam
is ahead. Indeed, about 98% of 242 players and coaches interviewed
5. We thank an anonymous referee for referring us to this literature.96 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
stated a preference for kicking ﬁrst and 96% explained their preference
in terms of putting pressure on the other team.
Finally, many of the studies on performance and stress in the
previous subsection are based on ﬁeld data from workplace settings.
For example, Baer and Oldham (2006) found evidence in support of the
IUH using ﬁeld data on employees at a cereal manufacturer and Singh
(1998) found a negative relationship between sales performance and
certain stressors (role ambiguity and role conﬂict) using survey data
from actual salespeople.
3. The Model and Results
3.1 Incorporating the IUH
According to the PET, the initial impact of anxiety is to induce worry, a
cognitive activity that uses up scarce attentional resources and crowds-
out the agent’s effort on the principal’s task. Because worry is evidently
the agent’s next best activity (anxiety causes a substitution away from
efforttowardworry)andhisdisutilityofeffortcapturestheopportunity
cost of time spent on the principal’s task, we incorporate the effects
of worry in the latter. In particular, we assume anxiety increases the
marginal cost of effort as the agent devotes more cognitive resources
toward worry. Likewise, the agent’s responses in terms of coping mech-
anisms and the re-allocation of effort resources also seem connected
to the marginal cost of effort. For example, positive thoughts (“self-
revalorisation”) which reduce worry and free up attentional resources
for the principal’s task reduce the marginal cost of effort. We therefore
incorporate the effects of anxiety into the linear model by assuming
the agent’s cost of effort depends on the standard deviation σI = βσ of
income:
U = α + βe − (1/2)φ(βσ)e2 − (1/2)rβ2σ2.( 3 )
This is the same as (2) except the constant k has been replaced by φ(σI).
In (3), the risk premium reﬂects the sense in which anxiety is generally
a “negative emotion” increasing in the level σI of stress, whereas the
motivationaleffectsofanxietycorrespondingtothethreemainelements
of the PET—worry, coping, and the re-allocation of effort resources—
are captured by the function φ. Assumptions 1 below operationalize the
IUH by assuming φ is smooth, positive, and U-shaped.
Assumptions 1: (i) φ is positive and twice continuously differentiable on
[0, ∞), with φ   > 0. (ii) There exists a constant ˆ σI > 0 such that φ  < 0 onAgency and Anxiety 97
[0, ˆ σI), φ (ˆ σI) = 0, and φ  > 0 on (ˆ σI, ∞). We assume φ (0) is ﬁnite. (iii) Let
ψ(σI) ≡ φ(σI) − σIφ (σI). (4)
There exists a constant ˜ σI > ˆ σI such that ψ(˜ σI) < 0.
As anxiety σI increases from a low level on [0, ˆ σI), the crowding-
out effects of worry are dominated by the agent’s adaptive responses
and φ and the marginal cost φe of effort fall. Assuming diminishing
returns to coping, the two effects are evenly balanced at ˆ σI, where
φ  = 0andφ achievesitsminimum.Afterthat,increasesinanxietyσI on
(ˆ σI, ∞)i n c r e a s eφ and the marginal cost of effort because the crowding-
out effect dominates. We postpone our discussion of (iii) until after
Proposition 1 below.
Remarks. In this paper, our purpose is not to explain the IUH but
to explore some of its implications for incentive and monitoring
mechanisms and to show that it can account for several empirical
anomalies. Although one would prefer a model that does both, our
approach via the reduced-form representation φ does have advantages
in terms of simplicity and generality, because the IUH lacks generally
accepted formal theoretical foundations and φ is noncommittal in that
respect.Anotherissueisthattheagent’spreferencesaredeﬁneddirectly
in terms of income risk σI instead of more basic outcomes such as
income. We discuss these and other related issues in detail in Section 4
below. 
3.2 Optimal Effort
Given output risk σ and the contract (α, β), the agent maximizes (3)
subject to e ≥ 0. Throughout the paper, partial derivatives are indicated
by subscripts.
Proposition 1: (i) The agent’s optimal effort is given by e = β/φ with
eβ = ψ/φ2 andeσ =− β2φ /φ2.(ii)TheIUHobtainsinthesensethatoptimal
effort and expected performance have an inverted-U relationship with β when
σ>0 is held ﬁxed and with σ when β>0 is held ﬁxed. (iii) The cross-partial
is
eβσ =
β
φ3

2σIφ 2 − φ(2φ  + σIφ  )

.( 5 )
In the linear model e = β/k, which is strictly increasing in incen-
tives and independent of output risk. In contrast, in our model e = β/φ
where φ is U-shaped in income risk. It follows that optimal effort has
an inverted-U relationship with output risk holding β>0 constant,98 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
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FIGURE 1. INCENTIVES, AND MARGINAL BENEFITS AND COSTS
OF EFFORT
where the maximum occurs at σI = ˆ σI. Assumption 1(iii) ensures that
eventually ψ<0 (the marginal cost of effort is sufﬁciently increasing
in income risk) and eβ < 0. Incentives are therefore counterproductive
whentheygeneratetoomuchanxietyasintheArielyetal.experiments.
We state (iii) for future purposes.
Figure1illustratesthetwomainforcesatworkwhentheprincipal
increases incentives.
From (3), the marginal beneﬁt of effort is the piece rate β, whereas
themarginal cost ofeffortisφe.InFigure 1,optimaleffortise1 whenthe
piece rate is β1 and the marginal cost of effort is MC1. If the principal
increases incentives from β1 to β2 then optimal effort would increase
from e1 to e2. In the linear model, there are no further effects and the
ﬁnal level of effort is e2.
In our model, however, an increase in incentives also increases
income risk and anxiety. If the former was initially low then the subse-
quent increase in anxiety provides an additional source of motivation
as per the IUH. In that case, φ falls and the marginal cost of effort shifts
right from MC1 to MC2, causing a further increase in effort from e2 to e3
foranoverallincreasefrome1 toe3.Inthiscase,incentivesareevenmore
powerful than in the linear model because of the additional motivational
effects of anxiety. In contrast, if income risk was initially high then the
increase in anxiety is demotivational and the marginal cost of effort shifts
up from MC1 to MC3, leading to a reduction in effort from e2 to e4.Agency and Anxiety 99
When the latter effect is strong enough, the overall impact of incentives
is to reduce optimal effort from e1 to e4. In this case, high-powered
incentives cause the agent to choke under pressure as in the Ariely et al.
experiments. Note that changes in output risk σ only shift the marginal
cost curve.
B´ enabou and Tirole (2003) show that incentives can have hidden
costs when they signal to the agent that the principal’s task is difﬁcult
or distasteful. In B´ enabou and Tirole (2006), incentives can discourage
prosocial behavior (e.g., donating blood) when they spoil the reputa-
tionalvalueofthelatterbycreatinguncertaintyaboutwhethertheagent
was motivated by prosocial preferences or money. Guo and Ou-Yang
(2006) show that optimal effort can be decreasing in incentives and the
risk–reward tradeoff violated when the agent chooses both effort and
output risk σ and his utility function exhibits wealth effects. Because
optimal effort is always increasing in incentives in B´ enabou and Tirole
(2003), none of these explanations seem to apply to the Ariely et al. and
related experiments discussed in the previous section.
3.3 Example
Assume
φ(σI) =
1
aσ2
I + bσI + c
.( 6 )
If a =− 1, b = 2, and c = 1 then φ is U-shaped as in Assumptions 1. In
this example, optimal effort is
e = β[c + βσ(b + aβσ)]. (7)
If we ﬁx the above parameter values and set σ = 2t h e nap l o to f
(7) as a function of β conﬁrms the inverted-U relationship stated in
Proposition 1(ii).
3.4 The Principal’s Problem and Ultra-Incentives
We assume the principal is risk neutral, the price of output is one, and
the agent’s outside option is zero. The principal’s proﬁt is therefore q −
I − M(σ) and her expected proﬁt e − α − βe − M(σ). After substituting
the agent’s participation constraint U = 0w eo b t a i n
  = e − (1/2)φe2 − (1/2)rβ2σ2 − M(σ). (8)100 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
In the standard case where φ is constant and σ is exogenous, we obtain
the familiar expression
βL =
1
1 + rσ2φ
(9)
for the optimal incentive in the linear model (see Bolton and
Dewatripont, 2005, p. 139).
In this paper, we follow Milgrom and Roberts (1992, Chapter
7) and assume the principal has access to a monitoring technology
which can reduce output risk σ at some cost, so output becomes a
more informative signal of effort. For example, the principal could
invest in better information and technology systems to more accurately
track and record performance or redesign the agent’s job to increase its
focus,makehisresponsibilitiesclearer,andhisperformancemoreeasily
measurable. This would reduce what Singh (1998) and the marketing
literaturerefertoas“roleambiguity.”Formally,weassumetheprincipal
canachieveadesiredlevelofσ atcost M(σ),where M  ≤ 0, M   ≥ 0,and
the marginal cost of monitoring is |M |=− M .L e tσ be the baseline
level of output risk associated with zero monitoring expenditure, so
M(σ) = 0.
After substituting optimal effort e = β/φ, the principal’s problem
is to choose β and σ to maximize (8) subject to 0 ≤ σ ≤ σ.
Proposition 2: (i) The principal’s problem has at least one solution which
entails 0 <β<2. (ii) The optimal incentive can exceed one (the price of the
product).
Given our normalization of the price, the optimal incentive (9) in
thelinearmodelneverexceedsone.Aswewillsee,however,theoptimal
incentive in our model does exceed one in a neighborhood of σ = 0
where anxiety is low and φ is decreasing. This is because incentives
increasethevalueoftheﬁrmbyreducingthecostofeffortmorethanthe
corresponding increase in the risk premium (the proof of Proposition 6
in the Appendix establishes this rigorously). Intuitively, arousal ranges
along the “sleep-high excitation continuum” (see the previous section)
and the agent perceives anxiety as excitement when anxiety is low and
is therefore willing to pay more than the ﬁrst best value of the ﬁrm.
Indeed, Zivnuska et al. (2002) ﬁnd an inverted-U relationship between
jobtensionandjobsatisfactionusingsurveydataon270hotelmanagers.
Note that these ultra-incentives assume no wealth constraints such as
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3.5 Optimal Incentives
Although Proposition 1 shows that exogenous incentives can be demoti-
vational in the sense that eβ < 0 at the agent’s optimum.
Proposition 3: A proﬁt-maximizing principal never offers counterpro-
ductive incentives in equilibrium.
Suppose eβ < 0 in equilibrium. Because ψ<0a n dφ  > 0( s e e
Assumptions 1 and Proposition 1), a reduction in incentives would
lower the agent’s cost of effort, increase optimal effort, and reduce the
risk premium. Such a contract could therefore never be optimal.
This simple result reconciles experimental ﬁndings like Ariely
et al. with empirical work based on ﬁeld data such as Lazear (2000),
where incentives have strong and positive motivational effects. Al-
though these two literatures appear contradictory, they may in fact
be complementary. Indeed, there is nothing inherently contradictory
about observing counterproductive incentives in experiments where
incentives are exogenous (Proposition 1) but not in workplace settings
wheretheyareendogenous(Proposition3).Furthermore,ﬁeldevidence
cannot be used to refute experimental evidence, despite Lazear’s claim
to the contrary (see the full quotation in the Introduction).
Glaeser (2003) makes a similar point much more generally but
informally:6
outside of the laboratory, emotionally-powerful situational
factors...arealmostalwaysendogenousandoftentheresult
of self-interested entrepreneurs. As such, laboratory work
and, indeed, psychology more generally, gives us little guid-
ance as to market outcomes.
(from the abstract)
Although Glaeser’s insight is valid in our model, it may not hold
generally. For example, Fehr and G¨ achter (2000) (see also their working
paper cited in their references) conducted a series of experiments where
principals in the trust treatment could only make lump-sum payments
in discretionary amounts, whereas those in the incentive treatment could
choose a ﬁne for agents caught shirking. The ﬁnes implemented in the
incentive treatment backﬁred in the sense that effort was signiﬁcantly
lower than in the trust treatment, although proﬁts were higher. These
experiments therefore suggest that proﬁt-maximizing incentives can
indeed be counterproductive (in terms of effort). Likewise, the majority
ofprincipalsintheGneezyandRustichini(2000,SectionIII)experiments
6. We thank an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this paper.102 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
(87% in the IQ experiment and 76% in the donation experiment) also
chose demotivational incentives.
Finally,wehaveassumedtheagent’stype(e.g.,thelevelofincome
riskthatmaximizeseffort)iscommonknowledge. Ifthereisincomplete
information, or the principal has to offer the same contract to a group
of heterogeneous agents, then incentives may only be motivational on
average.
3.6 Optimal Monitoring
We now consider the principal’s optimal choice of output risk σ.F i x
β>0. With zero monitoring, σ starts out at its maximum or baseline
level σ. Because optimal effort has an inverted-U relationship with σ,
an increase in monitoring holding incentives ﬁxed would reduce σ and
increase effort. On this region, there is therefore a positive relationship
between monitoring and optimal effort. As σ continues to decline, at
somepointincomeriskσI = βσ reaches ˆ σI whereeffortismaximized,so
furtherincreasesinmonitoringwillreduceeffortandbedemotivational
in that sense. Note that this discussion has implicitly assumed βσ>ˆ σI,
so β is large enough so the right-hand side of optimal effort which
is decreasing in σ is available. We formalize the above discussion as
follows:
Deﬁnition 1: Monitoring is motivational in equilibrium if eσ < 0 at the
optimum and demotivational if eσ > 0.
Proposition 4: Monitoring can be motivational or demotivational in
equilibrium. In particular, (i) monitoring is necessarily demotivational in
equilibrium when M  ≡ 0. (ii) Otherwise, a necessary and sufﬁcient condition
for motivational monitoring is βA <β L, where βA is the optimal incentive in
our model and βL is the optimal incentive (9) in the standard linear model.
Unlike incentives, the relationship between monitoring and effort
can be positive or negative in equilibrium. According to (i), monitoring
isnecessarilydemotivationalwhenthemarginalcost|M |ofmonitoring
is sufﬁciently low (zero in the extreme) because the principal chooses
a relatively small σ where anxiety is motivational. Condition (ii)
provides a useful and intuitive necessary and sufﬁcient condition:
the relationship between effort and monitoring is positive (negative)
when incentives are weaker (stronger) than the standard linear model
predicts. For example, monitoring is also demotivational when the
principal offers ultra-incentives (incentives that exceed one) as in
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Inthestandardmodel,therisk–rewardtradeoffholds—theprinci-
pal chooses low σ when incentives are high to reduce the risk premium
and high σ when incentives are low to conserve on monitoring costs
(see Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, Chapter 7). In our model, however,
σ has a direct effect on effort and the risk–reward tradeoff is violated
(see Proposition 6 below). In this context, the principal chooses high
σ (σI > ˆ σI) when monitoring is expensive, which implies high anxiety
and motivational monitoring (φ  > 0a n deσ < 0). To reduce anxiety, she
chooses relatively weak incentives βA <β L. In contrast, the principal
chooses low σ when monitoring is inexpensive, which implies low
anxiety, a low risk premium, and demotivational monitoring. In that
case, βA >β L because anxiety is motivational at low levels.
In our model, monitoring has a benign aspect because it reduces
the agent’s anxiety. There are, however, other forms of monitoring
that can have potentially negative effects. For example, Ariely et al.
and Dohmen (2008) ﬁnd evidence for the social pressure hypothesis,
where performance suffers in the presence of an audience (even a
sympathetic one). Indeed, Frey (1993) assumes monitoring reduces the
agent’s marginal beneﬁt of effort because it undermines trust, intrinsic
motivation, self-determination, and/or self-evaluation. On the other
hand, monitoring decreases the marginal cost of effort because it forms
thebasisforpenaltiesandrewards.Freysuggeststhatmonitoringtends
tobedemotivationalinclosepersonalrelationshipswheretheﬁrsteffect
dominates, but motivational in formal or distant agency relationships.
Akerlof and Kranton (2008) consider a similar set of issues, but from the
perspective of the economics of identity. In their model, monitoring is
formalized as the probability of detecting shirking and they provide
sufﬁcient conditions (p. 214) such that the principal prefers not to
monitor because it causes the agent to adopt an “outsider” status.
In terms of evidence, Barkema (1995) studies the relationship
between monitoring and effort (hours worked) using survey data on
116 senior managers in medium-sized Dutch ﬁrms. He ﬁnds that the
relationship is negative when the monitor is a fellow executive (the
CEO) but positive in the case of a distant parent company. Although
Barkema interprets his ﬁndings in terms of Frey (1993), they are also
consistent with Proposition 4 above. In close agency relationships, both
the marginal cost of monitoring and the baseline level ¯ σ of noise should
be relatively low because frequent contact should provide substantial
information about effort even with zero active monitoring. Both effects
implylowσ,lowanxiety,anddemotivationalmonitoring.Theopposite
should hold in formal or distant relationships.
Falk and Kosfeld (2006) conduct a series of experiments where
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in terms of “control or monitoring devices which restrain the agent
from his most opportunistic choices” (p. 1611).7 When the lower bound
is low, monitoring backﬁres in the sense that average effort is higher
when the principal simply trusts the agent. Those who were controlled
told the experimenters that it signaled distrust and undermined their
autonomy. As a result, a majority of principals elected not to monitor.
These ﬁndings are therefore consistent with Frey (1993) and Akerlof
and Kranton (2008).
In our model, monitoring is deﬁned in terms of risk reduction
rather than control, so the literature on stress and performance dis-
cussed in the previous section is more directly relevant. For example,
Singh (1998) ﬁnds that sales performance is negatively related to role
ambiguity,soanincreaseinmonitoringintheformofclearerprocedural
guidelines or job redesign to reduce the latter should be motivational.
This is consistent with Proposition 4(ii) above when the baseline level σ
of noise and the marginal cost of monitoring are relatively high, which
seems likely for salespeople.
3.7 The Informativeness Principle
As Prendergast (1999) notes, the informativeness principle is often
violated in real-world contracts. For example, many ﬁrms grant stock
options to all employees even though they impose signiﬁcant idiosyn-
cratic risk with only trivial incentive effects. Indeed, Oyer and Schaefer
(2005) reject the incentive-provision explanation for their use based on
calibrations of a version of the linear model. In our model, however, the
principal is averse to a completely static risk-free environment (unlike
the principal in the linear model, who achieves the ﬁrst best with zero
noise) because a moderate amount of risk is motivational in accordance
with the IUH.
Proposition 5: In our model, the principal never sets σ = 0 even when
the marginal cost of monitoring is zero.
The principal therefore injects pure noise into the contract when
σ is too low and the cost of doing so is not too large. This could be
achievedthroughproﬁt-sharing,stockoption,orstockownershipplans
which impose signiﬁcant risk but provide few incentives because of the
1/n problem, where n is the number of employees. Alternatively, the
principal could increase role ambiguity through less transparent objec-
tives,procedures,andguidelines,introducemoresubjectiveevaluation,
and/or change the composition of work groups to “shake things up.”
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In Casadesus-Masanell (2004), the informativeness principle fails
becausemoderateriskenvironmentsfavorthedevelopmentofaltruism,
ethical standards, and norms. Oyer (2004) shows that it can be optimal
to pay for noise that is positively correlated with the agent’s outside
opportunities in a version of the linear model with no moral hazard.
Our paper complements the latter in the sense that noise can also have
positive effects via the incentive compatibility constraint as well as the
participation constraint. Furthermore, our model shows why principals
tend to prefer noise (e.g., own-ﬁrm stock options) which have at least
some connection to the agent’s effort, whereas the optimal contract in
Oyer’s model depends on all signals that are informative about the
agent’s outside opportunities.
3.8 The Risk–Reward Tradeoff
In the linear model, incentives are decreasing in output risk when the
latterisexogenous(see(9)withφ constant).Ifoutputriskisendogenous,
incentives and monitoring are strategic complements for the principal
because an increase in incentives increases the risk premium and
thereforecallsforanincreaseinmonitoringtoreduceσ.Aftersurveying
therelevantempiricalliterature,however,Prendergast(1999)concludes
that the evidence for these predictions is “rather mixed.” Proposition 6
below shows that the risk–reward tradeoff is violated in our model in a
neighborhood of β = 1a n dσ = 0 (the ﬁrst best for the linear model).
Proposition 6: (i) There exists an open neighborhood of the point β = 1
and σ = 0 where incentives and output risk are strategic complements for the
principal, so incentives and monitoring are strategic substitutes. (ii) When σ
is exogenous, the risk–reward tradeoff is violated in that neighborhood.
To explain (i), we substitute β = 1a n dσ = 0 into (5) to obtain
eβσ =−
2φ (0)
φ(0)2 > 0. (10)
Itfollowsthatincentivesandoutputriskarecomplementaryinmotivat-
ingeffortinanopenneighborhoodofthatpointandarethereforestrate-
gic complements for the principal. That is, incentives and monitoring
are strategic substitutes. As for (ii), an exogenous increase in σ starting
from β = 1a n dσ = 0 will induce the principal to raise incentives above
one because incentives and output risk are strategic complements. The
latterarethereforelocallypositivelyrelated,sotherisk–rewardtradeoff
is violated.
Weillustrate(ii)inFigure2,whereweassumeφ hasthefunctional
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FIGURE 2. OPTIMAL INCENTIVE AND RISK (The monotone curve is the
optimal incentive in the standard linear model and the nonmonotonic curve is
the optimal incentive with anxiety)
The nonmonotonic curve is the optimal incentive βA in our model
as a function of σ, whereas the monotonically decreasing curve is
the optimal incentive βL in the linear model (9). We ﬁrst note that
βA increases from βA = 1 to slightly above βA = 1.1 as output risk
increases from σ = 0 to about σ = 0.35. As in Proposition 6(ii), the risk–
reward tradeoff is therefore violated. At some point, however, βA must
be decreasing in output risk because income risk increases the risk
premium and is also eventually demotivational. In Figure 2, the risk–
reward tradeoff holds for all σ ≥ 0.35, which suggests that in general
theoptimal incentive hasaninverted-U relationship withoutput risk as
depicted inFigure2.Second, weobservethat βA >β L beforeσ ≈ 1,and
βA <β L afterwards, which shows Proposition 4(ii) is not empty. This is
because incentives are more powerful inour model whenanxiety islow
(and therefore motivational) but less powerful when anxiety is high.
Intheabovediscussion,itappearsthatultra-incentives(incentives
above one) are necessary for violations of the risk–reward tradeoff as in
Figure 2. In Appendix B, we add a wealth constraint α ≥ 0a n ds h o w
that Proposition 6 above still holds, except incentives are always less
than one.
Alternative explanations include Guo and Ou-Yang (2006) men-
tioned previously and Prendergast (2002a), who shows that theAgency and Anxiety 107
principal prefers delegation and incentives in unstable environments
where she is uncertain about which action the agent should choose.
In contrast, the principal prefers authority and monitoring in stable
environments where there is more certainty about the appropriate
action,sothereisapositiverelationshipbetweenincentivesandrisk.
4. Discussion
4.1 Assumptions about Preferences
The theoretical literature on anxiety and the IUH includes the PET, the
psychological expected utility theory in Caplin and Leahy (2001), and
the endogenous learning-by-doing model in Rauh and Seccia (2006).
Because (3) contains a standard deviation σI inside a nonmonotonic
function φ, it appears that a simple expectation (i.e., integration) is
unable to produce such an expression (in contrast, the risk premium is
linearinthevarianceofincomeinthelinearmodel).Ourmodeltherefore
seems inconsistent with standard expected utility theory. Because the
anxiety concept is much broader than simple risk aversion, we do not
view this as a drawback of our approach. On the other hand, it can
be shown that (3) is consistent with the Caplin and Leahy framework,
albeit under restrictive assumptions about the main element in their
model—the map from economic outcomes to psychological states—
similar to the example in Section IV of their paper.8 The model in Rauh
and Seccia (2006) can be viewed as a formalization of the PET in a
speciﬁc learning context, but seems intractable for our purposes. Given
the lack of generally accepted formal theoretical foundations for the
IUH, we chose to assume it directly.
In our model φ is assumed to be a function of income risk σI,s o
the agent’s preferences are deﬁned directly in terms of σI as opposed to
morebasicoutcomessuchasincome.Asimilardeviationfromstandard
expected utility theory is used in mean-variance analysis in ﬁnance,
the sharecropping model in Stiglitz (1974), and other literatures—and
seems natural for comparison purposes within the linear framework of
Holmstr¨ omandMilgrom(1991).Itdoes,however,raisequestionsabout
the generality of our results.
Itmaythereforebeusefultoconsideraversionofthetwo-outcome
moralhazardmodelinBoltonandDewatripont(2005,Chapter4),where
anxiety is deﬁned as the difference in wages in the good and bad states
and the agent’s marginal cost of effort is again U-shaped in anxiety
as per the IUH. Because most of our results are driven directly by the
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IUH, we would expect them to generalize to that and other contexts.
Although this two-outcome version of our model does not require the
assumption oflinear contracts, itcannot distinguish between incentives
(alsothedifferenceinwagesacrossthetwostates)andanxietyascanthe
model in this paper. It would be appropriate, however, for the concept
of arousal (see Section 2) which is often deﬁned in terms of incentives
and motivation.
Finally, it is generally believed that emotions such as anxiety and
fear evolved in humans because of their motivational advantages (e.g.,
“ﬁght or ﬂight”). The literature on endogenous preferences, including
Rotemberg (1994) and Casadesus-Masanell (2004), offers one way to
formalize this.
4.2 Suboptimality of Linear Contracts
We chose to work within the linear framework of Holmstr¨ om and
Milgrom (1991) because the notions of “incentive” and output “risk”
have simple one-dimensional representations in terms of β and σ2.T h i s
allows us to incorporate the IUH in the form of a simple function φ of
income risk σI and to formalize monitoring as a costly technology that
reduces σ2.
As is well known, however, linear contracts are in general sub-
optimal. In particular, Mirrlees (1999) has shown (also see Bolton and
Dewatripont, 2005, Chapter 4) that the ﬁrst best can be approximated
arbitrarily closely by a contract which entails a severe punishment if
output falls below some lower threshold and a ﬁxed payment slightly
higher than the ﬁrst best (to compensate for risk) otherwise. It is
therefore natural to inquire how the addition of anxiety to the model
affects the suboptimality of linear contracts.
A crucial difference is that in our model the ﬁrst best level of
income risk should be positive because zero anxiety is suboptimal. In
that case, the principal should be able to set the three parameters in a
Mirrlees-type contract (i.e., the threshold, punishment, and reward) to
attainexactlyboththeﬁrstbestlevelofeffortandincomerisk.Incontrast,
in the general moral hazard model the principal can only approximate
the ﬁrst best because the agent is risk averse and the ﬁrst best level of
income risk is zero. Because linear contracts are dominated by Mirrlees-
typecontractsinbothsettings,withandwithoutanxiety,thequalitative
nature of their suboptimality is the same. In that sense, the addition of
anxiety does not appear to further undermine the assumption of linear
contracts.9
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If such punishments are infeasible, either by law or because
the agent is wealth-constrained, then Mirrlees-type contracts cannot
be enforced. Bose et al. (2008) consider a version of the Holmstr¨ om
(1979) moral hazard model where the agent is risk averse and has
zero wealth. Under speciﬁc functional forms for preferences and the
stochastic production process, they show that linear contracts perform
quite well relative to the unconstrained second best contract (in fact,
the former secure at least 90% of the expected proﬁts of the latter). This
is because the optimal linear contract approximates the unconstrained
optimal contract reasonably well for output levels in a neighborhood
of the second best effort. Although the approximation may be poor
elsewhere, those output levels are unlikely in equilibrium. In that case,
linear contracts may be preferred because of their simplicity.
A similar argument may be valid in our model. In particular,
Proposition 3 above suggests the principal is only interested in im-
plementing effort levels which are increasing in incentives. In that
case, the unconstrained second best contract should be increasing in
output in a neighborhood of the second best effort level and the optimal
linear contract may once again provide a good local approximation.
Intuitively, however, to reduce anxiety the unconstrained second best
contract may be an inverted-U in output, where the second best effort
level occurs to the left of the maximizer. Nevertheless, the gains to
implementing the unconstrained second best contract (or a piecewise-
linear approximation) may be small relative to additional contractual
complexity as in Bose et al. Furthermore, if the principal has access
to a monitoring technology (e.g., informative signals) then there will
be less need for an inverted-U wage schedule because the principal
can reduce output risk directly, and output levels outside the relevant
neighborhoodofthesecondbesteffortlevelwillbecomeevenlesslikely.
Bothoftheseeffectsshouldimprovetheapproximationprovidedbythe
optimal linear contract.10
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we assembled evidence from multiple disciplines that
anxiety, arousal, and stress collectively constitute one of the most
important psychological factors in professional principal–agent rela-
tionships. In particular, the experiments in Ariely et al. (2005) suggest
that extremely high-powered incentives can induce agents to “collapse
under pressure” in accordance with the inverted-U hypothesis. Our
purpose in the present paper was to show that their ﬁndings have
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broader implications for incentive and monitoring mechanisms, the
informativeness principle, the classical risk–reward tradeoff, and other
empirical anomalies. Although our model assumes (rather than ex-
plains)theArielyetal.ﬁndings,itdoesshowthatallofthesephenomena
may be a direct consequence of an extremely simple idea—that one
of the central tasks of management is to foster an optimal amount of
tension in the workplace. For example, if output risk (and therefore
income risk) is too small then the principal will either want to violate
the informativeness principle and inject some noise into the contract
or offer ultra-incentives which exceed the agent’s marginal revenue
product (although wealth constraints may prohibit the latter).
In terms of speciﬁc managerial implications, an important conclu-
sionofthepaperisthatmoderateincentivesmaybeevenmorepowerful
than standard theory predicts (see Figure 1) because moderate levels of
anxiety are motivational. Given the stylized fact that incentives tend to
be low powered in ﬁrms, this suggests that they may be under-utilized.
The inverted-U hypothesis may also have unexplored consequences
for organizational architecture that extend well beyond the issues
considered in this paper. For example, Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1991)
argue that for incentive reasons it may be optimal to bundle tasks into
jobs according to output risk, so that one agent performs exclusively
low-risk tasks and another high-risk tasks. In contrast, in our model it
may be optimal to mix them in order to achieve a medium (and perhaps
optimal) amount of tension for each. In light of the aforementioned
evidence on the importance of anxiety, we hope that the present paper
stimulates further work on these issues.
Appendix A
ProofofProposition1. Theexpressionsin(i)and(iii)followfromstraight-
forward computations. To prove (ii), ﬁx β>0. Because e = β/φ and φ
is U-shaped in σI, optimal effort is an inverted-U in σ.N o wﬁ xσ>0.
Becauseψ(0) = φ(0) > 0, eβ > 0atβ = 0.Forallβ>0, ψ  =− σIφ   < 0.
It follows that ψ is initially positive, strictly decreasing in β>0, and
eventually negative at ˜ σI by Assumption 1(iii). Because eβ = ψ/φ2 and
φ>0, optimal effort is at ﬁrst increasing in β, peaks at some unique
β>0, and is then decreasing in β. 
Proof of Propositions 2 and 3. Substituting optimal effort e = β/φ into (8),
  =
β

2 − β − rβσ2φ

2φ
− M(σ). (A1)Agency and Anxiety 111
It follows that 0 <β<2 at the optimum, so the principal effectively
chooses (β, σ) from the nonempty compact set [0, 2] × [0, ¯ σ]. Because
(A1) is continuous, a solution to the principal’s problem exists. The
ﬁrst-order condition for β is
 β =
2(1 − β)φ − 2rβσ2φ2 − (2 − β)βσφ 
2φ2 = 0( A 2 )
or
(2 − β)ψ − βφ(1 + 2rσ2φ) = 0. (A3)
Because β<2, we must have ψ ≥ 0a n deβ ≥ 0. The example in
connection with Figure 2 demonstrates that the optimal β can exceed
one. 
Proof of Propositions 4 and 5. We ﬁrst prove (i). Differentiating (A1),
 σ =
−2φ2(rβ2σ + M ) − (2 − β)β2φ 
2φ2 .( A 4 )
If M  ≡ 0 the numerator becomes
−2φ2rβ2σ − (2 − β)β2φ .( A 5 )
Because 0 <β<2a n dφ (0) < 0, (A5) is positive when σ = 0 which
therefore cannot be optimal. This proves Proposition 5. It follows that σ
is either interior or σ = σ so (A5) is nonnegative. Because φ>0t h eﬁ r s t
term must be negative. This implies φ  < 0 and completes the proof of
(i). To prove (ii), we re-arrange the numerator in (A2)
2φ

1 − β(1 + rσ2φ)

= (2 − β)βσφ .( A 6 )
Because σ>0, the sign of φ  is determined by 1 − β(1 + rσ2φ)a n d
(ii) follows. To provide an example of motivational monitoring in
equilibrium, we assume |M | is sufﬁciently large such that (A4) is
positive for all 0 ≤ σ ≤ σ. In that case, σ = σ at the optimum and
β is determined by (A6). Although the example in Figure 2 assumes σ is
exogenous, it still applies in the current context where only (A6)
is relevant and σ = σ. From Figure 2, we observe that monitoring
is motivational when σ is large enough so that βA <β L and therefore
φ  > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Differentiating (8) with respect to β,
(1 − φe)eβ − (1/2)σ

φ e2 + 2rβσ

.( A 7 )
Substituting the identity β ≡ φe,
(1 − β)eβ − (1/2)σ

φ e2 + 2rβσ

.( A 8 )112 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Asanaside,notethatifβ>1thenthereductioninthecostofeffortmust
be at least as great as the increase in the risk premium because eβ ≥ 0
(see the discussion following Proposition 2). To continue the proof, we
now differentiate with respect to σ,
(1 − β)eβσ − (1/2)e2 
φ  + βσφ  
− σ

φ eeσ + 2rβ

.( A 9 )
Substituting β = 1a n dσ = 0, this reduces to −(1/2)e2φ (0). Because e =
β/φ = 1/φ(0), the latter becomes −(1/2)[φ (0)/φ(0)2], which is strictly
positive. By continuity, this also holds in an open neighborhood of
β = 1a n dσ = 0. 
Appendix B
In this Appendix, we verify the claim following Proposition 6 that a
wealth constraint α ≥ 0 implies a violation of the risk–reward tradeoff
in a neighborhood of σ = 0 where incentives are less than one. That is,
violations of the risk–reward tradeoff are not necessarily tied to the use
of ultra-incentives. Assuming σ is exogenous, the principal maximizes
expected proﬁts e − α − βe subject to incentive compatibility e = β/φ,
the participation constraint
α + βe − (1/2)φe2 − (1/2)rβ2σ2 ≥ 0( B 1 )
and α ≥ 0. Substituting optimal effort, the principal maximizes
(1 − β)β
φ
− α (B2)
subject to
α + (1/2)
β2
φ
− (1/2)rβ2σ2 ≥ 0( B 3 )
and α ≥ 0. Given the latter, (B3) is redundant when σ2 ≤ 1/(rφ), which
holds in a neighborhood of σ = 0. For the rest of the proof, we assume
σ is sufﬁciently small such that (B3) is slack. The problem then becomes
max
α,β
(1 − β)β
φ
− α (B4)
subject to α ≥ 0o rs i m p l y
max
β
(1 − β)β
φ
,( B 5 )Agency and Anxiety 113
wherewedenotetheobjectivefunctionin(B5)as ˆ  .Theﬁrstandsecond
derivatives of ˆ   with respect to β are
(1 − 2β)φ − (1 − β)σIφ 
φ2 (B6)
and
2(1 − β)σIσφ 2 + σφ[(4β − 2)φ  − (1 − β)σIφ  ] − 2φ2
φ3 .( B 7 )
Setting (B6) equal to zero and solving,
φ  =
(1 − 2β)φ
(1 − β)σI
.( B 8 )
Substituting (B8) into (B7),
−
2φ + (1 − β)σIσφ  
φ2 < 0. (B9)
Because the second derivative is negative whenever the ﬁrst is zero, ˆ  
is strictly quasi-concave (see Vives, 1999). The problem therefore has
a unique solution on 0 <β<1. In particular, the solution is β = 1/2
when σ = 0. The cross-partial is
ˆ  βσ =
β

2(1 − β)σIφ 2 + φ [(3β − 2)φ  − (1 − β)σIφ  ]

φ3 . (B10)
At β = 1/2a n dσ = 0, (B10) reduces to
−
φ (0)
4φ(0)2 > 0. (A11)
It follows that an increase in σ leads to an increase in β at σ = 0a s
claimed in the text (see Vives, 1999, p. 30). Furthermore, (B5) shows that
the optimal incentive is always less than one. 
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